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Abstract 
The current research examined the tendency to volunteer in a Volunteer’s Dilemma 
Game, with the number of required volunteers and social status as main determinants. 
When more volunteers were needed to succeed in the volunteer’s dilemma, cooperation 
increased. This increase was not influenced by the status role the participants were 
assigned to. More specifically, social status turned out to have no effect on the tendency 
to cooperate at all, and did therefore not replicate earlier findings of social status on the 
Volunteer’s Dilemma. Some reasons for this lack of evidence are adduced and future 
implications are discussed. Together, these findings suggest that the more volunteers are 
needed, the more participants will cooperate. 
Keywords: Volunteer’s Dilemma, Social Status, Number of Required 
Volunteers, Cooperation, Power 
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Introduction 
You might remember an incident that happened in China in 2011. A toddler was 
ran over by a van. Trying to stay out of trouble, the driver drove off without even 
glancing if the girl was alright. Three citizens walked passed without paying any 
attention to the girl, let alone call authorities. Then, the toddler got hit by a second van, 
which also drove off. Another fifteen people walked by, looking at the girl but no single 
passerby helps her. Eventually a female garbage collector called the emergency services 
and called out for help. The child died in the hospital from brain injury. The whole 
incident was filmed by a security camera and the video went viral, shocking everybody 
all over the world. People are horrified to hear that a person in need is left to his or her 
own whilst there were many potential helpers present. An often first reaction to say is 
that they would have helped if they had been there, what kind of heartless person would 
walk by and do nothing?  
It was easy for western countries to blame what happened on the culture or the 
people who were walking by, thinking they were egocentric and apathetic to other 
people’s suffering. But the outrage to the incident was just as enormous in China itself 
as in other countries, and similar events have happened in other countries as well. A 
famous case is the murder of Kitty Genovese. In 1964 in Queens, New York, a young 
lady was brutally stabbed in front of her apartment building that was surrounded by 
flats. The killer stabbed her twice at first, but when she cried for help and he noticed 
that people saw him he was deterred and fled. After a while when he observed that none 
of the people witnessing the assault came down to help Kitty, he returned to finish the 
job, stabbing her multiple times until she died from her injuries. This case received a lot 
of attention because although the murderer took more than half an hour to kill his 
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victim, none of the 38 witnesses took action, none of them had even called the police 
department (Rosenthal, 1964). The lack of intervention from the witnesses was seen as 
inhuman and unconscionable. Hardening of society, moral decay, alienation and anomie 
were suggested as possible causes for this gruesome event. But indifference towards a 
victim does not necessarily need to be the cause of the choice not to intervene (Darley & 
Latané, 1968; Latané & Nida, 1981). Another, far more likely reason to explain such 
phenomena is that at least one of the witnesses had to make a contribution (calling the 
police) to provide the public good (public safety, saving the victim and getting helped 
when you are the one in need), but because they could not talk to each other, they 
counted on another witness to take action (Weesie, 1994). This situation was 
characterized in game theoretic terms for the first time by Diekmann (1985), which he 
dubbed ‘the Volunteer’s Dilemma’.  
The Volunteer’s Dilemma (VOD) is a n-person binary choice game where 
players can either choose to cooperate or to defect to attain the collective good. One 
single actor is sufficient to produce the public good and contributions do not vary in 
quality and more than one contribution will not increase the value of the collective 
good. All the players have symmetric payoffs in this model, and the cost of volunteering 
is lower than the cost of no one volunteering. In the Volunteer’s Dilemma, it is not 
immediately clear what outcome is best for all players, there is no dominant strategy. 
Due to absence of communication and the decisions being made simultaneously, there is 
no way to know if a player should volunteer or defect. So the collective good is 
produced by the volunteer, but this production is costly. When there has been 
volunteered, the volunteer profits as well. When no one volunteers, every single person 
in the group loses. 
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There has been some research done in the domain of the Volunteer’s Dilemma, 
mainly on the effects of group size on the outcome of social dilemmas. Darley and 
Latané (1968) did an experiment to find out why someone would choose to not help 
someone in need, and thought this had to do with diffusion of responsibility. When 
more people are present, the pressure to take action as volunteer does not focus on only 
one person, but the responsibility to help out spreads among all the people who are 
present. Because they do not feel directly accountable, they will be less likely to 
volunteer than when they are the only one present (which makes it less ambiguous who 
should take action). Furthermore they are more likely to think that someone else already 
has taken action. According to their experiment, participants are less likely and it would 
take them longer to volunteer when the group size is bigger. Several research supports 
this idea (Weesie & Franzen, 1998; Murnighan, Kim, & Metzger, 1993; Brännström, 
Gross, Blasius & Dieckmann, 2011) and Archetti (2009) found that the fraction of 
volunteers decreases with group size, even when groups have a high average 
relatedness. 
Darley and Latané (1968) concluded that situational factors are a big influence 
on the urge to volunteer, more than dispositional factors. Although this is the case, the 
question still remains that, when situational factors are held constant, what kind of 
people are more likely to volunteer in a social situation. An important situational 
variable in social situations is an individual’s social status: the relative rank that an 
individual holds in a social hierarchy. Status can either be ascribed (gotten at birth e.g. 
race, sex etc.) or achieved (e.g. personal qualities or effort) (Coie, Dodge, & Coppotelli, 
1982). Someone’s social status and thus their power will differ per social context. You 
can be team captain in your sports team, and have a higher status than for example team 
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members who are often sitting on the bench, but at the same time you can be a 
subordinate at work with a whole range of superiors above you. But who would be more 
likely to volunteer if, for example, a referee is needed to be picked from that same 
sports team? The captain, or the less competent player? And the same goes for the work 
floor scenario, if someone from your team has to do some extra over-hour work, 
because otherwise there will be some drastic sanctions, who in the hierarchy would step 
up and volunteer first? 
People’s social status and their power in social situations can either be high or 
low. People with low power and low social status often have less monetary resources, 
educational opportunities and health than people with high social status and power 
(Szaflarski, 2006). High-power individuals, in contrast to low-power individuals, are 
more optimistic and are more likely to express dominant rather than submissive acts 
(Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Wiggins, 1991). 
Individuals experiencing high-power states have a more agentic orientation, which 
manifests itself in self-protection, self-assertion and self-expansion (Rucker, Galinsky, 
& Dubois, 2012). They tend to be more self-oriented and less likely to take the 
perspective of others (Galinksy et al., 2006). Low-power states elicit a communal 
orientation, this manifests itself in the tendency to consider others in thinking and 
decision-making. They are more sensitive and focused on their participation as an 
individual in a larger social group. Low-power individuals will pay more attention to 
others and are less likely to act without considering these others (Rucker et al., 2012). It 
also turned out that individuals with low-power are more likely to convey pro-social 
behavior, such as helping others and donate to charity (Rucker & Galinsky, 2008; Piff, 
Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010). So because high-power individuals are more 
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self-involved and less concerned with others, whilst low-power individuals are more 
considered of others and more likely to perform helping behavior, we predict that: low-
power individuals are more likely to volunteer in a Volunteer’s Dilemma than 
high-power individuals (H1a). 
But on the other hand, research found that high-power individuals are more 
likely to experience the feeling that they have the responsibility to contribute, more than 
low-power individuals (Kirkpatrick, Duck, & Foley, 2013). Low-power and -status 
individuals often feel under rewarded and experience more negative feelings. They 
justify their little contribution to the public good by the resentment they feel because of 
this (Kirkpatrick et al., 2013). A low-power individual will often feel less responsible 
for producing the public good, and could therefore be less cooperative. Whilst in 
contrast individuals with high-power will have a sense of social responsibility and could 
therefore be more cooperative in a volunteer’s dilemma (Fleishman, 1988). Which leads 
us to the following prediction: high-power individuals are  more likely to volunteer 
in a Volunteer’s Dilemma than low-power individuals (H1b). 
The group size is not the only variable that can be increased, the number of 
required volunteers can be increased as well. In this situation, not just one volunteer is 
needed to create the public good, but a higher fixed fraction of the group. Although 
there is no strong theory in this area, several research suggests that requiring more 
volunteers should increase the number of volunteers (Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, & van 
der Kragt, 1986; Murnighan et al., 1993). Rapoport (1985) proposed that, when 
volunteering, an individual’s contribution can be either: futile (unnecessary because not 
enough volunteers will be reached to succeed), critical (the public good is provided only 
if the individual contributes) or redundant (unnecessary because the public good will be 
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provided regardless his/her contribution). According to him, the individual facing a 
public good dilemma will make an estimate of the probability that he or she will be 
futile, critical or redundant in providing the public good. The individual will cooperate 
only and only if his or her estimate of being critical (and thus gaining from cooperating) 
is above a certain value (which fluctuates per dilemma and group size). When the 
number of required volunteers goes up, but the group size stays the same, participants 
are probably less likely to estimate they are redundant. The probability that the 
participant will estimate that it is impossible to reach the goal (because they believe that 
it is impossible to reach that many volunteers), and thus he or she will be futile, could 
increase when the number of volunteers required is increased. But in the case of the 
current study, the estimation will not increase drastically because two out of four instead 
of one out of four cooperating will not seem like a goal that is impossible to meet. When 
two volunteers are needed, participants will be less likely to think that two others will 
volunteer and that the public good will be produced without his or her help. Because of 
this the participant’s estimation of being critical will go up and thus his or her likelihood 
to cooperate instead of defect. 
Furthermore, when the cost of the public good provision is divided among more 
than just one of the players, the cost of volunteering is lowered and the probability of 
cooperating and producing the good will increase (Foddy, Smithson, Schneider & Hogg, 
2013). This is because people do not want to be only one who is out of luck and has to 
pay for the costs. But as the English adage ‘a trouble shared is a trouble halved’ goes, 
when someone else has to undergo the same faith, it seems more bearable and not as 
bad. For example, imagine there has been a snowstorm and power has gone out. 
Someone has to walk five kilometers trough the blizzard to the nearest telephone pole to 
notify the electricity company. Imagine having to do this all by yourself, walking 
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through the dark and cold thinking about all the other people who are staying behind in 
a warm house, not having to take the terrible walk. This does not seem very inviting, 
does it? However, what if you do not have to walk all alone but more than one person 
will have to walk to the telephone pole? Although this is still not the most fun way to 
spend your leisure time it seems not as bad. The costs of walking through the snow are 
shared and therefore decreased. 
Also fairness seems to play a role in the decision to cooperate or defect. Research 
showed that cooperation in a public-good dilemma increases with perceived fairness 
(Eek, Biel, & Gärling, 2001). So when the individual in the volunteer’s dilemma is not 
the only one that has to pay effort to produce the public good, for example when more 
than one volunteer is required, the sense of fairness will go up (in comparison to when 
the individual is the only one volunteering), and thereby the likelihood of an individual 
to cooperate. So all taken together, we predict that: increasing the required number of 
volunteers in a Volunteer’s Dilemma Game will lead to an increase in the number 
of volunteers (H2). 
Research findings suggest that high-power individuals like to be in control. They 
perceive a higher feeling of control and behave this way, even in situations where 
control is out of the question, e.g. rolling a dice (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & 
Galinsky, 2009). This tendency to overestimate the amount of control they have in a 
certain situation results in greater risk-taking (Tracy & Anderson, 2014; Anderson & 
Galinsky, 2006). Research of Strickland, Lewicki, and Katz (1966) showed that when 
an individual’s perceived control goes down and becomes smaller than before, this 
results in a decreased likeliness to act in a risk-taking fashion.  
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One could say that in the case of a volunteer’s dilemma, free-riding is risky 
behavior compared to playing it safe and cooperating. Participants make an estimation 
in their minds of the chance that their cooperation will be needed to produce the public 
good (Rapoport, 1985). The likelihood that one is needed in the two required volunteers 
condition is higher than in the one required volunteer condition, as a higher fraction of 
the group is needed to produce the public good. Therefore it is riskier to defect in the 
two required volunteers condition than in the one required volunteer condition. Because 
the situation is riskier and people are risk averse in gain situations (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), the likelihood to volunteer will go up when more volunteers are needed 
(as predicted in hypothesis 2). This increase in volunteering behaviour applies to all 
status conditions. But although participants in the high power condition will perceive 
the two required volunteers situation as more risky than the one required volunteer 
condition, they will probably perceive the two required volunteers situation as less risky 
than participants in the low power condition would. This is because high power 
individuals often perceive more control and less risk in situations compared to low 
power individuals, even when this is not necessarily the case (Tracy & Anderson, 2014; 
Strickland et al., 1966).  
Thus we expect that volunteering will go up in the two required volunteers 
condition in comparison to the one required volunteer condition, but predict an 
interaction effect and expect this increase in volunteering to be steeper in the low social 
status condition than in the in the high social status condition. As people with high 
status will perceive the two required volunteers situation as riskier than the one required 
volunteer condition, but not as risky as the low power individuals experience this. We 
predict that: individuals participating in a Volunteer’s Dilemma Game are more 
SOCIAL STATUS AND REQUIRED NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS AS  10 
DETERMINANTS OF COOPERATION IN A VOLUNTEER’S DILEMMA  
 
   
likely to volunteer when the required number of volunteers increases, but the 
increase in volunteering will be bigger for individuals experiencing a low-power 
state than for individuals experiencing a high-power state (H3). 
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Method 
 
Research Design 
In this lab experiment participants had to complete a survey and a by us 
compiled Volunteer's dilemma game (VOD). These tasks were performed with a 
maximum of eight participants at a time, independently from each other in separate 
cubicles. There was one dependent variable (the intention to volunteer, yes or no), and 
two independent variables (a leadership manipulation and a varying number of required 
volunteers). Our research design was a 3 (leader vs. subordinate vs. control) x 2 (one 
volunteer vs. two volunteers) between subjects factorial design. So there were six 
different categories (cells) the participants could be assigned to.  
Participants 
We collected data from 206 participants, with approximately 34 or 35 
participants per cell. Most of our participants were recruited at the Leiden University, 
and all participants were Dutch. For participating in our study the participants received 
either one course credit (requisite for their studies) and €1,50 or €3,50. 
Procedure  
The researchers approached potential participants and asked if they were 
interested to participate in an experiment about decision making skills. They received a 
short explanation about the content and duration of the research. When a participant 
agreed to participate, he or she was scheduled to perform the experiment in our lab. We 
tried to get as much participants as possible at the same time in our lab to make it more 
believable that other participants were completing the VOD game with them. All 
participants were guided to their private cubicles, where they were asked to read and 
sign an informed consent form. They were explained that they were allowed to stop 
SOCIAL STATUS AND REQUIRED NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS AS  12 
DETERMINANTS OF COOPERATION IN A VOLUNTEER’S DILEMMA  
 
   
with the experiment any time without giving any reasons. On a computer monitor the 
participants first received instructions about the VOD and some questions that reassured 
that they understood what was expected from them. They were told that they would 
either have a leadership or an subordinate role in the VOD. When a participant was in 
the control condition, he or she did not receive any information about a role in the VOD. 
All the participant’s roles were assigned randomly. After filling in the informed consent 
form and receiving instructions and their role, participants started the VOD. When 
participants were done, they left the cubicle and received their money or course credit. 
There was room to ask questions at the experiment leaders present and these questions 
were answered truthfully. No participants were unsatisfied or felt that they were done 
wrong after finding out the real way the game was played.  
The Volunteers Dilemma task 
We composed an experiment where the participants encountered a dilemma to 
either pick the outcome best for themselves, or the outcome that is best for the greater 
good. Participants were by themselves in separate cubicles, but were led to believe their 
results were interdependent with three other participants in separate cubicles who were 
completing the game with them. Participants were made to believe this by escorting 
them to their cubicles at the same time with others and telling them that, because they 
played the game together, they all had to start at the same time. They had to choose to 
either receive €2 or €4, which seemed an easy choice. However, an additional rule was 
that at least one (or two, when participants were in the two volunteers required 
condition) person(s) had to volunteer and choose €2, otherwise everyone would receive 
nothing. So one (or two) had to volunteer and choose the lesser amount of money, 
whilst others were receiving a double amount to succeed. The participants were led to 
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believe that they would actually receive the sum of money they picked, provided that at 
least one (or two) participant(s) had volunteered to receive the €2 option. This was not 
really the case, as participants played individually and the results were not 
interdependent. Everyone received the same amount of money after they had completed 
the game. Before performing the VOD, participants were asked a few questions to 
verify if they understood the task. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable was a dichotomous variable, namely the choice of the 
participant to either volunteer (pick €2) or not volunteer (pick €4). After all data was 
collected we investigated whether leaders or subordinates are more likely to volunteer, 
and whether people are more or less likely to volunteer when more volunteers are 
needed in order to succeed.  
Leadership manipulation   
A state of low or high power can be quickly and simply elicited by assigning 
individuals to an actual hierarchal role of a superior/subordinate for a single task 
(Galinsky et al., 2003). When participants started the game they received a message 
whether they were a ‘leader’ or a ‘subordinate’ in the VOD. Participants in the control 
condition did not receive any information about their role in the VOD. Assigning 
participants to one of the roles or the control condition was at random. In every VOD 
(except the control condition) participants were led to believe that there were two 
leaders and two subordinates, this two-two divide was chosen so that there can be no 
assumptions made by the participants on who had to volunteer according their role. For 
example, if there was one leader and three subordinates, and one volunteer was needed, 
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it might seem logical that the leader had to volunteer. By creating groups with even 
amounts of leaders and volunteers we ruled out this problem.  
 
Number of Required Volunteers Manipulation   
To investigate if people are more or less likely to volunteer when they are not 
the only one who is needed to succeed, we informed half the participants that at least 
one person had to volunteer and choose for the lower amount of money to get paid. The 
other half of the group was informed that there were at least two participants needed for 
a successful outcome. The assignment of groups to either the one or two volunteers 
condition was also at random. 
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Results 
Procedure Check 
To ensure that the participants understood how the task worked we asked them 
three questions. These three question were (a) how much money does a group member 
get if he/she decides to opt for 2 euros? (81.6% answered correct); (b) how much do the 
4 group members earn if they all pick 4 euros? (96.6% answered correct) and (c) how 
much does a group member earn if he/she chooses for 4 euros, but one (or two) of 
his/her fellow group members picks 2 euros? (96.1% answered correct). We decided to 
draw a line and exclude participants from our sample if they answered all three 
questions wrong. None of the participants fell in this category, so in our opinion they all 
sufficiently understood what the task was about. 
Status Check  
Participants were randomly allocated to either the leader, subordinate or control 
condition. To find out whether participants understood to which group they were 
assigned to, we asked them to indicate what they thought their condition was (‘leader’, 
‘subordinate’ or ‘no info’). Ninety seven percent of the participants answered this 
question correctly according their allocated group. From the three percent that deviated 
from the correct answer, three participants were from the control condition, two from 
the subordinate condition and one from the leader condition. This indicates that over all 
the status allocation was understood clearly.  
Required Volunteers Check  
Participants could face a Volunteer’s Dilemma task where there were either one, 
or two volunteers required to succeed. To ascertain that the participants in the different 
conditions understood which condition they were randomly assigned to, they were 
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asked to indicate how many volunteers were required to succeed (‘one volunteer’, ‘two 
volunteers’ or ‘no info’). Ninety eight percent of the participants correctly indicated the 
number of required volunteers corresponding to their condition. Two percent answered 
the question incorrectly, whereof three participants were from the two volunteers 
condition and two from the one volunteers condition. This altogether indicates that the 
required volunteers classification was understood correctly.  
Manipulation Check  
To explore the differences in volunteering behavior between low-power and 
high-power individuals, we told participants either that they were the leader in the game 
(high-power), that they were the subordinate in the game (low-power) or we did not tell 
them anything at all (control condition). To test if by using this manipulation 
participants actually identified themselves with, and had the role that they were assigned 
to, we asked four questions after they had completed the task. The questions were as 
follows: (a) to what extent did you feel like you had a high status during the group 
task?; (b) to what extent did you feel like you had a low status during the group task?; 
(c) to what extent did you see yourself as a leader during the task? and (d) to what 
extent did you see yourself as a subordinate during the task? All questions were to be 
answered on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 being ‘to a small extent’ and 7 ‘to a large 
extent’. 
To test the internal consistency between these four items a Cronbach’s Alpha 
statistic was used. The scores on questions (b) and (d) were reversed. The retrieved 
Cronbach’s Alpha from the four questions was α=.618, which is not very high (>.7) but 
acceptable (Kline, 2013). This means that the alpha is sufficient enough to state that the 
items measure the same construct. Deleting one of the items would decrease the alpha 
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and thus the internal consistency. Therefore all four items were combined into one scale 
(measuring feelings of high power).  
Participants who were allocated to the leader condition scored higher on this 
newly created scale (M = 5.24), F(2, 203) = 73.77, p < .001, than participants in the 
subordinate (M = 3.43) or control (M = 3.89) condition. A Tukey Post Hoc test pointed 
out that there was a significant difference between the Leader and the Subordinate 
condition (p < .001) and between the Leader and the Control condition (p < .001). This 
indicates that participants who were in the leader condition had higher feelings of high 
power than participants who were assigned to the other two conditions. There was also a 
significant difference between the subordinate and the control condition (p = .011), 
which indicates that Subordinates scored even lower than participants in the control 
condition on experiencing feelings of high power. Altogether this indicates that telling 
participants they belonged to one of the three conditions, manipulated their status the 
way intended. 
Participants choices to volunteer 
Our first two hypotheses (1a and 1b) predicted a difference between high and 
low status individuals’ degree of volunteering in a Volunteer’s Dilemma Game. 
Hypothesis 1a stated that low-power individuals would be more likely to volunteer in a 
Volunteer’s Dilemma than high-power individuals. Hypothesis 1b predicted the exact 
opposite: high-power individuals would be more likely to volunteer in a Volunteer’s 
Dilemma than low-power individuals. To find out if there was any difference between 
the two groups we carried out a logistic regression analysis. The Chi-square statistic was 
used to check whether there was a significant effect between the status manipulation 
and the decision of participants to volunteer or defect. The test yielded no significant 
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results, χ² (2, N = 206) = 3.12, p = .210. There was no effect of status (being leader or 
subordinate) on decision-making in the Volunteer’s dilemma game. This outcome 
remained the same after checking for suppressor effects by doing a regression analysis 
using the backwards LR method. So hypotheses 1a and 1b both have to be rejected. This 
might be due to a manipulation tactic that was to weak, this will be discussed later in the 
discussion session.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that increasing the required number of volunteers in a 
Volunteer’s Dilemma Game would lead to an increase in the number of volunteers. 
Using a Chi-square statistic, we tested if the Volunteers manipulation (one or two 
volunteers) had an effect on decision-making in our Volunteer’s Dilemma game, and it 
proved to be significant, χ² (1, N = 206) = 7.31, p = .007. Within the One Required 
Volunteer condition only 49.5% of the participants chose to volunteer and opt for 2 
euros (51 out of 103 times), compared to the Two Required Volunteers condition where 
68.0% of the participants chose to volunteer (70 out of 103 times) (see Table 1). Thus, 
results of the tests supported the second hypothesis. Participants were more likely to 
volunteer when more volunteers were needed to obtain the public good.  
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Table 1. Choice differences within the Number of Required Volunteers condition, the 
Status condition and the Interaction. 
Condition Volunteer 
(opt for 
 2 euro’s) 
Defect  
(opt for  
4 euro’s) 
Total 
  (N) 
 
Number of Volunteers Required 
   
One Volunteer Required 51 (49.5%) 52 (50.5%) 103 
Two Volunteers Required 
 
Status Condition 
Leader 
Subordinate 
Control 
 
Interaction 
Leader x One Volunteer 
Leader x Two Volunteers 
Subordinate x One Volunteer  
Subordinate x Two Volunteers 
Control x One Volunteer  
Control x Two Volunteers 
70 (68.0%) 
 
 
35 (50.7%) 
42 (60.9%) 
44 (64.7%) 
 
 
15 (44.1%) 
20 (57.1%) 
17 (48.6%) 
25 (73.5%) 
19 (55.9%) 
25 (73.5%) 
 
33 (32.0%) 
 
 
34 (49.3%) 
27 (39.1%) 
24 (35.3%) 
 
 
19 (55.9%) 
15 (42.9%) 
18 (51.4%) 
9 (26.5%) 
15 (44.1%) 
9 (26.5%) 
103 
 
 
69 
69 
68 
 
 
34 
35 
35 
34 
34 
34 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicted an interaction effect between the Status manipulation and 
the Required Volunteers manipulation. It was expected that the decision to volunteer 
would increase when the number of required volunteers was two instead of one, but that 
this increase in volunteering would be bigger within the low power than in the high 
power condition. A logistic regression analysis was performed with status (leader or 
subordinate) and the number of required volunteers (one volunteer or two volunteers) as 
independent variables, and the choices made by the participants (volunteer or defect) as 
dependent variable. This test yielded insignificant results, χ² (2, N = 206) = .614, p = 
.736. This suggests that the effect of status (being leader or subordinate) does not differ 
between the number of volunteers required (one or two volunteers). It is possible that 
the results were nonsignificant due to small cell sizes (N=34) or a weak manipulation of 
the status condition, these options will be discussed further in the discussion section.  
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Discussion 
The present study looked into how social status and the number of required 
volunteers influenced people’s choices on whether to volunteer or not in a Volunteer’s 
Dilemma. 
The results were not fully in line with the predictions. The findings of the 
experiment did not provide evidence that social status plays a role in people’s choices to 
volunteer or not. We expected the results to show that either high or low status would 
lead to an increase in volunteering behaviour, and although there was a notable 
difference between the three conditions, these differences were not significant. Based on 
this study, it does not matter if one has a high social status or a low social status for their 
volunteering intentions.  
Results on the required number of volunteers condition were largely in 
agreement with the predictions. It turned out that when the number of required 
volunteers increased, the number of participants that volunteered increased as well. 
According to our data, this increase was independent of the status conditions, with the 
number of volunteers increasing to the same extent despite having a different status. 
This resulted in no interaction effects on volunteering behaviour.  
First the results and the expected and unexpected outcomes will be discussed in 
more detail. Restrictions and future directions will follow thereafter, ending with some 
concluding remarks.  
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Social Status and the tendency to Cooperate  
There was no main effect of social status on the tendency to volunteer. This was 
surprising, because in former research these results were repeatedly found. Although we 
stated that our manipulation check was sufficient, the manipulation had no significant 
main or interaction effect on the outcome variables, suggesting that our manipulation of 
power was too weak to have any effects 
We discussed using the MAI (Management Assessment Inventory) for the 
leadership manipulation instead of the current procedure, where participants were just 
randomly assigned to their roles. With the inclusion of the MAI participants would 
believe that their assigned social status role would be based on their abilities according 
to their performance on the questionnaire (although this was not true and allocation 
would still be random), whilst in current study they knew it was a random allocation 
because they did not have to do anything to achieve their status. It is possible that 
randomly assigning participants to one of the conditions creates feelings of unfairness. 
Because the participants were aware that the that the assignment to the high power 
position was random, low power participants might feel cheated, which could possibly 
heighten their feelings of negative emotion and make them cooperate less often than 
they actually would have done (Marmot, 2004; Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 
2000).  
We decided to leave the MAI questionnaire out after discovering that by just 
allocating participants to a condition would probably be sufficient and yield the same 
results. This was one of the major differences with the study by Okere (2012) who used 
almost the same procedure as in the current study, but did find significant effects of 
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social status. Another study (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002) also found weak effects when 
they randomly assigned participants to one of the power conditions, they proceeded 
their research using stronger manipulations, which did yield significant results. This 
might point out the importance of using the MAI or any other leadership questionnaire 
prior to allocating participants to a condition.     
Furthermore, even though a lot of experimental research has used role 
allocations in manipulating power, power is not simply the control over resources or 
composed solely of one’s social position. It is also a psychological state, a perception of 
one’s capacity to influence others (Galinsky et al., 2003). For example, parents have a 
large amount of power and control over their children, but still often find themselves 
powerless and with little control. So an individuals’ personal sense of power is distinct 
from socio-structural indicators of their power, and it could therefore be important to 
include a questionnaire measuring participants actual sense of power (Anderson, John & 
Keltner, 2012) to check if the power manipulation was indeed successful.  
More research should be done on the effect of using a leadership questionnaire 
or leaving one out to discover the importance of such procedures. It could be interesting 
to compare the outcomes of procedures where participants were randomly assigned to 
procedures with allocations based on real competence, to see if randomly allocated 
participants actually feel as powerful as people with real competence or only act like it 
because they got assigned to it in the task. Although the current study was not fully 
successful in creating differences in power among participants, it may spur upcoming 
research to draw comparisons between random allocations and allocations that 
participants believe are legitimate (by for example using a questionnaire). 
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Number of Required Volunteers and the tendency to Cooperate  
Participants who were in the two required volunteers condition cooperated more 
often than participants who were in the one required volunteer condition. This outcome 
was as expected because we argued that participants would estimate that their 
cooperation was needed more when more volunteers would be required. The chance that 
one could just free-ride with no consequences becomes smaller as the number of 
required volunteers increase. Because the dilemma was framed as a gain, participants 
are risk averse and settle for gaining any amount of money, as long as it is certain (or a 
bigger probability that it is).  
Although it has been found that a bigger fraction of participants cooperate when 
more volunteers are required, it does not necessarily mean that this is always the case 
and that our results are generalizable to all groups. It might be that this effect only is 
present in small groups. In bigger groups, participants may perceive a smaller likelihood 
of achieving the required number of volunteers (so might 30 out of 60 seem harder to 
achieve than 2 out of 4, which is both 50%). Participants in larger groups might feel like 
they are never going to reach the number of volunteers required and could be more 
inclined to feel futile (unnecessary because not enough volunteers will be reached to 
succeed) (Rapoport, 1985). They might act out of dejection and feel pessimism at their 
chances of reaching enough volunteers. Therefore it could be possible that, for example, 
negative affect and less interest about the outcomes could lead to more free-riding, 
which would result in insufficient volunteering. So in future research these differences 
in group sizes would be interesting to examine.  
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Restrictions and future directions  
There might be some practical issues concerning the comprehensiveness of our 
task. A fairly low number of people (81.6%) answered the question correctly regarding 
the amount of money they would get if they opted to volunteer. This is a very important 
piece of information to make a fully informed decision in the task. We should check if 
our formulation of the task is clear and vary and test it to check if it is comprehensible 
enough. Maybe including a couple of extra examples and more questions testing the 
understanding of the task would help to increase the comprehensiveness for future use.  
There were also no significant results on any of the motivational items we 
measured. This raises the question whether these motivations actually do not play a part 
in decision-making regarding volunteering, or that the questions were not elaborate and 
thorough enough. In earlier research effects on some of these motivations were shown, 
but we were unable to replicate these findings (Ostrom, 1998; Fleishman, 1988; 
Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton & Bushman, 2004). It may be possible that no significant 
effects on the motivations could be found due to the use of self-report questionnaires in 
the present study. These can be subject to several biases, especially the social 
desirability bias, even if answers are anonymous and handled confidentially. It could be, 
for example, that participants indicated higher or lower levels of power than they 
actually experienced, just because they were told that they were in one of either groups 
and wanted to conform. Therefore social desirability might have influenced participants 
answers and therefore their scores.  
Another limitation was that anecdotal feedback suggests that participants, 
despite our best efforts, not always believed that they were doing the test simultaneously 
with other participants. Not because they did not see anyone around and thought that a 
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game including four people would be highly doubtful, but mainly because they did not 
believe that the computers were linked (a lot of participants pointed this out), even 
though we did not make any remark that the computers were, or should be linked in our 
procedure. This decreases the credibility of the task and therefore makes the decision-
making process less realistic. This is a unnecessary flaw in the current study and can be 
prevented easily in upcoming studies by explaining a plausible procedure and leaving 
no place for ambiguity.     
As is the case in most other experimental studies, we made use of mainly 
university students as participants. As such, the levels of education and socioeconomic 
status are higher than in the total population. This can be a limitation of the 
generalizability of the present study’s results. It might be that the results regarding the 
status are less pronounced than it would have been in the overall population because 
students generally have a higher socioeconomic status. Participants were mainly 
recruited from Leiden, and therefore may only apply to the Dutch population in the 
region around Leiden.  
Furthermore, we only investigated socially isolated situations where participants 
faced a potential gain. Thus risk of losses and the dynamics of complicated social 
interactions were not included. Which are often present in a real life volunteer’s 
dilemma. As for example in a situation where in order for everyone to watch a very 
important and desirable football match, someone has to repair the television antenna on 
the roof during the game, but will miss a bigger part (if not all) of the game in doing so. 
This was another aspect that was different from the procedure of Okere (2012), she 
made use of a loss frame, whilst our study was framed solely in terms of gains. The use 
of a gain frame may have caused participants to be satisfied that they were getting any 
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amount of money at all and therefore cared less about the outcomes of the volunteer’s 
dilemma and thus their choices.  
Research suggests that people who are given little contact with others will 
mainly have concern for themselves and not for others. The presence of social isolation 
seems to lower people’s social conscience (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). It might be that 
participants act greedier and volunteer less often than they would have done in a real 
life volunteer’s dilemma. And it therefore makes the current study, as many laboratory 
studies, hard to generalize to the outside world. It could be interesting to examine this 
difference in egocentric behaviour in future research by, for example, making the task 
less socially isolated through showing pictures or something other personal to the 
participant about the others in the game. Previous research showed that a subtle 
introduction of social values (as for example showing a picture) may already reduce 
selfish behaviour in a Dictator game (Wang, Zhong, & Murnighan, 2014).  
Not necessarily a restriction because it was not included in current research, but 
it might be useful to ask for people’s decision motivation. How bad did they want the 
money? As in former research, participants did not view 10 dollars as a meaningful 
amount of money and that participants volunteered mainly for course credit, which they 
would receive anyway (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). So might some people for example 
feel indifferent between receiving two or four euros and see it as a win-win situation. 
Not as a loss if they do not receive four, but only as a gain. Others could be very 
interested in the money and could be strongly motivated by anticipated feelings of 
regret, whilst others might be motivated in an altruistic manner. Just like in real life 
situations, some people will volunteer more quickly just because they do not mind the 
cost.  
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To conclude, our research aimed at exploring the effects of social status and the number 
of required volunteers on the tendency to cooperate in a Volunteer’s Dilemma. The 
findings were that participants do volunteer more readily when more volunteers are 
required to reach success. As for social status, the results mainly led to more questions 
that need to be taken a closer look at. In the future it might be interesting to investigate 
the importance of the use of questionnaires in leadership manipulations. 
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